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Abstract— This paper discusses the use of computer–aided
verification as a practical means for analysing quantum infor-
mation systems; specifically, the BB84 protocol for quantum key
distribution is examined using this method. This protocol has
been shown to be unconditionally secure against all attacks in
an information–theoretic setting, but the relevant security proof
requires a thorough understanding of the formalism of quantum
mechanics and is not easily adaptable to practical scenarios.
Our approach is based on probabilistic model–checking; we have
used the PRISM model–checker to show that, as the number of
qubits transmitted in BB84 is increased, the equivocation of the
eavesdropper with respect to the channel decreases exponentially.
We have also shown that the probability of detecting the presence
of an eavesdropper increases exponentially with the number
of qubits. The results presented here are a testament to the
effectiveness of the model–checking approach for systems where
analytical solutions may not be possible or plausible.
I. INTRODUCTION
That quantum–mechanical phenomena can be effectively
exploited for the storage, manipulation and exchange of in-
formation is now a widely recognised fact. The whole field of
quantum information poses new challenges for the information
theory community and involves several novel applications,
especially with respect to cryptology.
Recent interest in quantum cryptography has been stim-
ulated by the fact that quantum algorithms, such as Shor’s
algorithms for integer factorization and discrete logarithm
[1], threaten the security of classical cryptosystems. A range
of quantum cryptographic protocols for key distribution, bit
commitment, oblivious transfer and other problems [2] have
been extensively studied. Furthermore, the implementation of
quantum cryptographic protocols has turned out to be signifi-
cantly easier than the implementation of quantum algorithms:
although practical quantum computers are still some way in the
future, quantum cryptography has already been demonstrated
in non-laboratory settings [3] and is well on the way to
becoming an important technology.
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Quantum cryptographic protocols are designed with the
intention that their security is guaranteed by the laws of
quantum physics. Naturally it is necessary to prove, for any
given protocol, that this is indeed the case. The most notable
result in this area is Mayers’ proof [4] of the unconditional
security of the quantum key distribution protocol “BB84” [5].
This proof guarantees the security of BB84 in the presence
of an attacker who can perform any operation allowed by
quantum physics; hence the security of the protocol will not be
compromised by future developments in quantum computing.
Mayers’ result, and others of the same kind [6], [7], [8],
are extremely important contributions to the study of quantum
cryptography. However, a mathematical proof of security of
a protocol does not in itself guarantee the security of an
implemented system which relies on the protocol. Experience
of classical cryptography has shown that, during the progres-
sion from an idealised protocol to an implementation, many
security weaknesses can arise. For example: the system might
not correctly implement the desired protocol; there might be
security flaws which only appear at the implementation level
and which are not visible at the level of abstraction used in
proofs; problems can also arise at boundaries between systems
and between components which have different execution mod-
els or data representations. We therefore argue that it is worth
analysing quantum cryptographic systems at a level of detail
which is closer to a practical implementation.
Computer scientists have developed a range of techniques
and tools for the analysis and verification of communication
systems and protocols. Those particularly relevant to security
analysis are surveyed by Ryan et al. [9]. This approach has
two key features. The first is the use of formal languages
to precisely specify the behaviour of the system and the
properties which it is meant to satisfy. The second is the use of
automated software tools to either verify that a system satisfies
a specification or to discover flaws. These features provide a
high degree of confidence in the validity of systems, and the
ability to analyse variations and modifications of a system very
easily.
In this paper we present the results of applying the above
methodology to the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol.
We have carried out an analysis using PRISM1, a probabilistic
model-checking system. Our results confirm the properties
which arise from Mayers’ security proof; more significantly,
they demonstrate the effectiveness of the model-checking
approach and the ease with which parameters of the system
can be varied.
Our model could easily be adapted to describe variations
and related protocols, such as “B92” and Ekert’s protocol
([10], [11] describe these protocols in detail). Also, our
model can be modified to account for implementation–level
concerns, such as imperfections in photon sources, channels,
and detectors.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
AND SECURITY CRITERIA
The objective of key distribution is to enable two commu-
nicating parties, Alice and Bob, to agree on a common secret
key ~k ∈ {0, 1}N , N > 0, without sharing any information
initially. Once a common secret key has been established,
Alice and Bob can use a symmetric cryptosystem to exchange
messages privately. In a classical (i.e. non–quantum) setting, it
is quite impossible to perform key distribution securely unless
assumptions are made about the enemy’s computational power
[10].
The use of quantum channels, which cannot be tapped or
monitored without causing a noticeable disturbance, makes
unconditionally secure key distribution possible. The presence
of an enemy is made manifest to the users of such channels
through an unusually high error rate. We will now describe
the BB84 scheme for quantum key distribution, which uses
polarised photons as information carriers.
BB84 assumes that the two legitimate users are linked by
two specific channels, which the enemy also has access to:
1) a classical, possibly public channel, which may be pas-
sively monitored but not tampered with by the enemy;
2) a quantum channel which may be tampered with by an
enemy. By its very nature, this channel prevents passive
monitoring.
The first phase of BB84 involves transmissions over the
quantum channel, while the second phase takes place over
the classical channel.
Convention 1: The pair of quantum states {|0〉 , |1〉} is the
rectilinear basis of the Hilbert space H2, and is denoted by
⊞.
Convention 2: The pair of quantum states
{ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) , 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} is the diagonal basis of
the Hilbert space H2, and is denoted by ⊠.
Definition 1: The encoding function fBB84 : D×B 7→ H2
1See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜dxp/prism.
where D = {0, 1}, B = {⊞,⊠} is defined as follows:
fBB84(0,⊞) = |0〉 (1)
fBB84(1,⊞) = |1〉 (2)
fBB84(0,⊠) =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) (3)
fBB84(1,⊠) =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) (4)
The BB84 protocol can be summarised as follows:
1) First Phase (Quantum Transmissions)
a) Alice generates a random string of bits ~d ∈
{0, 1}n, and a random string of bases~b ∈ {⊞,⊠}n,
where n > N .
b) Alice places a photon in quantum state |ψi〉 =
fBB84(di, bi) for each bit di in ~d and bi in ~b, and
sends it to Bob over the quantum channel.
c) Bob measures each |ψi〉 received, with respect to
either ⊞ or ⊠, chosen at random. Bob’s measure-
ments produce a string
−→
d′ ∈ {0, 1}n, while his
choices of bases form
−→
b′ ∈ {⊞,⊠}n.
2) Second Phase (Public Discussion)
a) For each bit di in ~d:
i) Alice sends the value of bi to Bob over the
classical channel.
ii) Bob responds by stating whether he used the
same basis for measurement. If b′i 6= bi, both
di and d′i are discarded.
b) Alice chooses a subset of the remaining bits in ~d
and discloses their values to Bob over the classical
channel. If the result of Bob’s measurements for
any of these bits do not match the values disclosed,
eavesdropping is detected and communication is
aborted.
c) The common secret key, −→k ∈ {0, 1}N , is the string
of bits remaining in ~d once the bits disclosed in
step 2b) are removed.
There are two points to note in order to understand BB84
properly. Firstly, measuring with the incorrect basis yields a
random result, as predicted by quantum theory. Thus, if Bob
chooses the ⊠ basis to measure a photon in state |1〉, the
classical outcome will be either 0 or 1 with equal probability;
if the ⊞ basis was chosen instead, the classical outcome would
be 1 with certainty. Secondly, in step 2b) of the protocol, Alice
and Bob perform a test for eavesdropping. The idea is that,
wherever Alice and Bob’s bases are identical (i.e. b′i = bi),
the corresponding bits should match (i.e. d′i = di). If not, an
external disturbance has occurred, and on a noiseless channel
this can only be attributed to the presence of an eavesdropper.
For more information, the reader is referred to [10], [11].
We turn now to the formal security requirements for BB84.
Among other things, a protocol such as BB84 must ensure that
an enemy’s presence is always made manifest to the legitimate
users and that, if a key does result from the procedure,
it is unpredictable and common to both users. But most
importantly, the protocol must ensure privacy: an enemy must
never be able to obtain the value of the key. Moreover, even
if an enemy is able to obtain a certain quantity of information
~v by trying to monitor the classical channel, that quantity has
to be minimal; meanwhile, the enemy’s uncertainty about the
key, H(~k|~v), must be maximised.
Definition 2: The conditional entropy of the key ~k (of
length N ) given the view ~v is defined as:
HN (~k|~v) = − 1
Pr{N}
∑
k
∑
v
Pr{k, v} log (Pr{k|v})
Such requirements are usually expressed in terms of se-
curity parameters. For quantum key distribution, the security
parameters are conventionally written n and ~ǫ. The parameter
n is the number of quantum states transmitted, while ~ǫ denotes
collectively the tolerated error rate, the number of bits used to
test for eavesdropping, and related quantities [4]. We use the
parameter n instead of the key length N , as these are assumed
to be linearly related. For instance, the value of H(~k|~v) is
some function of n and ~ǫ: H(~k|~v) = ϕ(n,~ǫ). The proof [4]
stipulates that H(~k|~v) should be exponentially small in n and
~ǫ. Formally,
ϕ(n,~ǫ) 6 c · e−gn (5)
lim
n→∞
ϕ(n,~ǫ) = 0 (6)
noting that the choice of n over N as the parameter only
changes the value of the constant g, and not the functional
relationship. We will demonstrate later for BB84 that, the
probability that an enemy succeeds in obtaining more than
n
2 key bits correctly is a function of the form (5).
Mayers’ security proof of BB84 formalises the notion of
privacy by defining a quantum key distribution protocol as
“f–private,” if, for every strategy adopted by an enemy, the
average of the quantity N −H(~k|~v) is less than or equal to
some constant f . This definition of privacy merely requires
the key to be uniformly distributed, when the key length N
is known. A more conventional privacy definition would have
required that the mutual information I(~k,~v) be less than or
equal to κ, but this is not entirely satisfactory [4].
III. MODEL CHECKING TECHNIQUES
AND THE PRISM TOOL
The theoretical proof of BB84’s security is a significant
and valuable result. However, to prove a similar result for a
different scheme or cryptographic task is far from trivial and
is likely to involve new, ever more specialised derivations. A
more flexible approach to analysing the security of quantum
cryptographic protocols is clearly desirable. Manufacturers of
commercial quantum cryptographic systems [12], for instance,
require efficient and rigorous methods for design and testing. A
suitable approach should allow for modelling implementation–
level details and even minor protocol variations with relative
ease. We believe that model–checking is such an approach, and
we will demonstrate its application to BB84.
Model–checking is an automated technique for verifying
a finite–state system against a given temporal specification
[13]. Using a specialised software tool (called a model–
checker), a system implementor can mechanically prove that
the system satisfies a certain set of requirements. To do this,
an abstract model, denoted σ, is built and expressed in a
description language; also, the desired behaviour of the system
is expressed as a set of temporal formulae, Φi. The model and
the formulae are then fed into the model–checker, whose built–
in algorithms determine conclusively whether σ satisfies the
properties defined by the Φi (i.e. whether σ |= Φi for each
property Φi). Model–checking should not be confounded with
computer–based simulation techniques, which do not involve
an exhaustive search of all possibilities.
For systems which exhibit probabilistic behaviour, a varia-
tion of this technique is used; a probabilistic model–checker,
such as PRISM [14], computes the probability
Pr{σ |= Φi} (7)
for given σ and Φi. PRISM models are represented by
probabilistic transition systems, and are written in a simple
guarded–command programming language. System properties
for PRISM models are written in Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic (PCTL).
PRISM allows models to be parameterised: σ =
σ(u1, . . . , uk). Thus the probability (7) may be computed for
different values of u1, . . . , uk; this is termed an experiment.
By varying one parameter at a time, it is possible to produce
a meaningful plot of the variation of (7).
IV. ANALYSIS OF BB84 USING PRISM
We have built a model of BB84 for use with PRISM. It is
not possible to present the source code for this model here, due
to space limitations; however, the full source code is available
online2, and is discussed extensively in [15].
A system description in PRISM is a computer file containing
module definitions, each module representing a component of
the system. In our description of BB84, there is a module
corresponding to each party involved in the protocol and a
module representing the quantum channel. Each module has
a set of local variables and a sequence of actions to perform;
an action typically takes one of the following two forms:
[s] g → (v1 := val1); (8)
[s] g → 0.5 : (v1 := val1) + 0.5 : (v1 := val2); (9)
In (8), the variable v1 is assigned the value val1; in (9), v1 is
assigned either the value val1 or val2 with equal probability.
Part of the expressive power of PRISM comes from the ability
to specify arbitrary probabilities for actions; for example, one
could model a bias in Alice’s choice of polarisation basis, in
BB84, with an action such as:
[choosebasis ] true → 0.7 : (al basis := ⊞) (10)
+0.3 : (al basis := ⊠);
2See http://go.warwick.ac.uk/nikos/research/publications/index.html
.
In this example, Alice is biased towards choosing the rec-
tilinear basis. Knowledge of this syntax is sufficient for an
understanding of the PRISM description of BB84. In what
follows, we will discuss the properties which we have been
able to investigate.
As discussed in section II, there are two security require-
ments for BB84 of interest:
1) an enemy’s presence must not go unnoticed; if the legit-
imate users know that an enemy is trying to eavesdrop,
they can agree to use privacy amplification techniques
[20] and/or temporarily abort the key establishment
process.
2) any quantity of valid information which the enemy is
able to obtain through eavesdropping must be minimal.
We can use our model of BB84, denoted henceforth by
σBB84, to compute the probability
Pr{σBB84 |= Φi} (11)
where Φi is a given PCTL property–formula. Therefore, in
order to verify that BB84 satisfies the security requirements
just mentioned, we have to reformulate these requirements in
terms of probability.
Firstly, we should be able to compute exactly what the
probability of detecting an enemy is. In our PRISM model,
we can vary n, the number of photons transmitted in a trial of
BB84, and so this probability is a function of n. Let us write
the probability of detecting an enemy as
Pdet(n) = Pr{σBB84 |= Φdet} (12)
In (12), Φdet represents the PCTL formula whose boolean
value is true when an enemy is detected. Before we give the
definition of Φdet, we should state the random event E that
occurs when an enemy is detected; this will allow us to write
Pdet(n) as a classical probability Pr(E ).
In BB84, an enemy, Eve, is detected as a result of the
disturbance inevitably caused by some of her measurements.
Just as Bob, Eve does not know which polarisation bases were
used to encode the bits in Alice’s original bit string. Eve has
to make a random choice of basis, denoted b′′i , which may or
may not match Alice’s original choice, bi. If b′′i = bi, Eve
is guaranteed to measure the i-th photon correctly; otherwise,
quantum theory predicts that her measurement result will only
be correct with probability 0.5.
In a so–called intercept–resend attack, Eve receives each
photon on the quantum channel, measures it with her basis
b′′i , obtaining bit value d′′i , and then transmits to Bob a new
photon, which represents d′′i in the b′′i basis. If Eve’s basis
choice is incorrect, her presence is bound to be detected. But
for detection to occur, Bob must choose the correct basis for
his measurement. Whenever Bob obtains an incorrect bit value
despite having used the correct basis, this is because an enemy
has caused a disturbance. Note that we are assuming a perfect
quantum channel here; an imperfect channel would produce
noise, causing additional disturbances.
So, to summarise, an enemy’s presence is made manifest as
soon as the following event occurs:
(b′′i 6= bi) ∧ (b′i = bi) for some i 6 n
or equivalently, as soon as:
E ≡ (b′i = bi) ∧ (d′i 6= di) for some i 6 n (13)
Therefore, the probability of detecting an enemy’s presence
in BB84 may be written:
Pdet(n) = Pr{E }
= Pr{(b′i = bi) ∧ (d′i 6= di) for some i 6 n}
The corresponding PCTL formula for PRISM is:
Φdet ≡ {true U (b′i = bi) ∧ (d′i 6= di)}
The PRISM model of BB84 uses elaborate variable names,
e.g. bob basis instead of b′i, and alice bit instead of di.
The value of Pdet(n) for 5 6 n 6 30 has been calculated
with PRISM, which computes (12); the result is shown in
Figure 1.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Pdet(n)
n
×××
××××
××××××××
×××××××××××
Fig. 1. The probability that Eve is detected in the BB84 Protocol while
performing an intercept–resend attack, as a function of the security parameter
n. The crosses indicate data points produced by PRISM, while the dotted
curve is a non–linear least–squares fit to these points.
The first requirement for BB84, namely that it should be
possible to detect an enemy’s presence, clearly is satisfied.
As we can see from Figure 1, as the number of photons
transmitted is increased, the probability of detection tends
toward 1, i.e. we conclude that
lim
n→∞
Pdet(n) = 1
We will now consider the second security requirement. Let
Ci denote the event in which Eve measures the i-th photon
transmitted correctly. The probability that Eve measures all
photons correctly, and hence is able to obtain the secret key,
is the product
Pall =
∏
0<i6n
Pr{Ci} = Pr{C1}Pr{C2} · · ·Pr{Cn}
We will examine the variation of a quantity proportional to
Pall, namely the probability P>1/2(n) that Eve measures more
than half the photons transmitted correctly.
According to the second security requirement for BB84, the
amount of valid information obtained by an enemy must be
minimised; we will investigate the variation of the probability
P>1/2(n) = Pr{σBB84 |= Φ>1/2}
as a function of the number of photons transmitted. We expect
this quantity to grow smaller and smaller with n.
The PRISM model of BB84 includes a counter variable, nc,
whose value is the number of times that Eve makes a correct
measurement. The formula Φ>1/2 may be written in terms of
this variable:
Φ>1/2 =
{
true U
(
nc >
n
2
)}
Given σBB84 and Φ>1/2, PRISM produces the plot shown in
Figure 2; it can be seen from the figure that P>1/2(n) decays
exponentially with n.
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Fig. 2. The probability that Eve, by performing an intercept–resend attack,
makes more than n
2
correct measurements in BB84, versus the security
parameter n.
Figures 1 and 2 each contain two superimposed plots: the
data points marked with crosses are actual values produced
by PRISM, and the dotted curves are nonlinear functions to
which the data points have been fitted. We have used the
Levenberg–Marquardt nonlinear fitting algorithm to compute
values c1, c2, c3 and c4 such that:
Pdet(n) ≈ 1− c1 exp[−c2n]
P>1/2(n) ≈ c3 exp[−c4n]
In particular, the values obtained are (to three decimal
places): c1 = 1, c2 = 0.134, c3 = 0.909, and c4 = 0.081. It
is evident that, increasing the number of photons transmitted,
or equivalently, the length of the bit sequence generated by
Alice, increases BB84’s capability to avert an enemy: the
probability of detecting the enemy increases exponentially,
while the amount of valid information the enemy has about
the key decreases exponentially.
These results are in agreement with Mayers’ claim (see
[4]), that “in an information–theoretic setting, which is our
case, a quantity fN such as the amount of Shannon’s infor-
mation available to Eve must decrease exponentially fast as
N increases.” Remember, we have assumed that the number
of transmissions, n, is linearly related to N .
Variations in the protocol can be accommodated easily by
modifying the PRISM model. For example, in [16] a bias
in Alice’s choice of basis is introduced, and this can be
described by a PRISM action such as (10). This influences
the performance of BB84; it alters the variation of both
Pdet(n) and P>1/2(n). It is also possible to vary a posteriori
probabilities with PRISM, such as the probability that, for any
given transmission, the enemy’s choice of measurement basis
matches Alice’s original choice. This probability is not usually
taken into consideration in manual proofs, and is likely to be
useful for modelling more sophisticated eavesdropping attacks.
It should be noted that the results presented here are not
as general as Mayers’. For instance, we have assumed that a
noiseless channel is being used, and we have only considered
a finite number of cases (namely, where 5 6 n 6 30). Related
techniques from computer science, which are better suited
for a full proof of unconditional security, do exist; the most
appropriate of these is automated theorem proving [13]; we
will leave this for future work. This technique is not restricted
to finite scenarios, and can provide the generality needed for
a more extensive analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analysed the security of the BB84
protocol for quantum key distribution by applying formal
verification techniques, which are well–established in theo-
retical computer science. In particular, an automated model-
checking system, PRISM, was used to obtain results which
corroborate Mayers’ unconditional security proof of the pro-
tocol. Compared to manual proofs of security, our approach
offers several advantages. Firstly, it is easily adapted to cater
for other quantum protocols. It also allows us to analyse
composite systems, which include both classical and quantum–
mechanical components. Finally, we are not only able to
model abstract protocols — as presented here — but concrete
implementations as well.
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